Often an organization or government must allocate goods without collecting payment in return. This may pose a di¢ cult problem either when agents receiving those goods have private information in regards to their values or needs or when discriminating among agents using known di¤erences is not a viable option. In this paper, we …nd an optimal mechanism to allocate goods when the designer is benevolent. While the designer cannot charge agents, he can receive a costly but wasteful signal from them. We …nd conditions for which ignoring these costly signals by giving agents equal share (or using lotteries if the goods are indivisible) is optimal. In other cases, those that send the highest signal should receive the goods; however, we then show that there exist cases where more complicated mechanisms are superior. Finally, we show that the optimal mechanism is independent of the scarcity of the goods being allocated.
Introduction
One of the basic problems in economics is how to allocate scarce resources or goods. One of the fundamental di¢ culties a-icting such allocation is private information: knowing who desires the goods the most. While markets work well with such allocation, the market is not always a feasible or desired mechanism for allocation. In case of kidneys it may be unethical to have a market, while in case of sports or concert tickets it may be undesirable to sell the tickets to the highest bidder.
1 Finally, with the allocation of charitable goods, it is not only undesirable to collect payment in return but those needing it the most are also the least able to pay for it. 2 Hence, we often see markets being replaced with other mechanisms.
One method used is instead of goods being allocated to the person who is willing to pay the most; they are allocated to who is willing to work the hardest to get them. Sport and concert tickets are given, often using …rst-come …rst-serve mechanism, that is, whoever is willing to wait the longest before the promoters start selling, gets the tickets. Allocation of research funds by agencies like National Science Foundation in USA and Economic and Social Science Research Council in UK to various universities and individuals are done based on research proposals (where a well-crafted proposal has a higher chance of being funded).
A common feature in these examples is that in order to convey their valuation, individuals must incur a socially wasteful cost. As with waiting overnight in a long line, generally at least part of this e¤ort is socially wasted.
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Another mechanism that is common with charity, but, surprisingly, also prevalent elsewhere, is to allocate evenly or randomly using a lottery (among those appearing identical when classi…ed according to public information). 4 Often baseball playo¤ tickets are o¤ered via a lottery. 5 Likewise, NCAA College bowl tickets have a lottery amongst only the season ticket holders. Research funds are often handed evenly amongst certain groups or individuals. For example, most universities hand out …xed research grants to all new sta¤. Allocating goods equally (ex-ante) has the disadvantage of ignoring any private information, but has the advantage of saving the potential recipients'e¤ort.
In this paper, we …nd the optimal mechanism to allocate homogeneous, not-necessarilydivisible goods when the bids made by the agents competing for the goods are socially wasted. Initially, we maximize the social surplus (ex-ante optimality) when values and costs of signalling is private information. We …nd the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for when allocating the goods randomly is optimal. In addition, we …nd the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for when distributing the objects to those who work the hardest (a contest)
is optimal. We also …nd cases when other mechanisms can be optimal, such as using a contest but randomly allocating the objects amongst any that meet a certain threshold of e¤ort (a contest with a bid cap). One interesting result of our paper is that an optimal mechanism does not depend upon scarcity of the goods being allocated. We also show that our results extend to where a designer may favor one type over another (other interim e¢ cient allocations).
The intuition that drives our results are that using signals increases the probability that the good will be allocated to the person who values it the most; however, this naturally also increases the costs due to signals being wasted. Which mechanism is optimal depends upon this trade-o¤ determined by the distributions values and signalling costs.
There are many papers examining contests or lotteries, but as opposed to this paper, most study the case where a seller wishes to maximize revenue. Amongst these, Moldovanu and Sela (2001) study the best way to split prize money in a contest, and Gavious, Moldovanu and Sela (2002) analyze contests, where depending on the nature of the cost function bid caps may be more pro…table or not. While, Goeree et al. (2005) rank lotteries and contests mentioned otherwise, everyone is given an equal chance. We call a ra-e a lottery where chances are sold. 5 More precisely, the price is set below the market clearing price. Since the demand exceeds supply, a lottery was used to determine who has the right to buy tickets. Among the teams that have used a lottery system was 2006 NY Mets (baseball). in fund raising mechanisms and Fullerton and McAfee (1999) model research tournaments and show that it is optimal to limit the number of participants to two. One paper that does examine allocation with a benevolent designer and thus close in spirit to our paper is Che and Gale (2006) . They …nd that when agents have wealth constraints in a pure market, those that value goods the most cannot necessarily a¤ord them. Hence, sometimes a random allocation can be superior. 6 Again with a benevolent designer, Hoppe, Moldovanu and Sela (2008) , compare match making between two groups (such as men with women)
by pairing those displaying the highest costly signal to that of random matching. Finally, Hartline and Roughgarden (2008) study the bene…t of wasteful signalling in a computer science application.
In the next section we discuss the allocation problem and convert it into a mechanism design problem in Section 3. In Section 4, we present the results of our analysis. Finally, in Section 5, we make our …nal remarks and present our conclusions.
Allocation Problem
The designer's problem is to allocate M homogeneous, not-necessarily-divisible goods among N agents where M < N . The designer is benevolent and wishes to maximize the social surplus. Each agent i has a privately known type i 2 [0; 1] that is drawn independently from cumulative distribution F . Agent i has value v( i ) for at most one object, where v( i )
is strictly positive for i > 0; continuous and twice di¤erentiable. (If goods are divisible, the value to agent i is minfq i ; 1g v( i ) where q i 0 is the fraction of good agent i receives.)
Each agent i is able to send a costly signal x i 2 R + to the designer. The cost to the agent of sending signal x i depends upon his type and equals c(x i ) g( i ) 0, where c(x i ) is weakly positive, continuous and strictly increasing while g( i ) is strictly positive for i < 1, 6 Another path to solving the allocation problem is by using psuedo-market systems where exogenously given points are substituted for money. These are used in the allocation of both interviews and courses for MBA students (see Brams and Taylor, 1996; Brams and Kilgour, 2001; Sönmez and Ünver, 2005) . However, to work, these require more than one type of objects to be allocated (for an alternative use of points) and may be costly to implement. continuous and twice di¤erentiable. The function g( i ) captures how the agent's type a¤ects the cost of signalling. So if for instance g( i ) = 1 i , then the higher the type of the agent, the less costly it is for him to send a high signal. Likewise, if g( i ) = i + 1, then the higher the type of the agent, the more costly it is for him to send a high signal. When g( i )
depends upon i ; the designer is able to see the signal x i , but does not know the agent's cost of sending the signal. For instance, if the signal is standing in line x i hours, the designer is able to see how long the agent stands in line, but is unable to determine the (opportunity) cost to the agent.
Following Milgrom (2004, page 111) , without loss of generality we can rewrite our problem using the uniform distribution on [0; 1] in place of F .
7 Finally, we assume that
is weakly increasing for 0 < i < 1. 8 This can be interpreted as the higher the type, the higher the maximal willingness to send a signal for the object. 9 This is equivalent to the
This condition assures that if an agent of type i is willing to send signal x to have a certain chance of receiving the object then all agents with types e i i will also be willing to send that signal for the same chance (single crossing). 10 We also assume that v; g are analytic.
After the agents send costly signals, the designer receives these signals (x 1 ; : : : ; x N ) and uses them to allocate the M goods by rule a : R N + ! [0; 1] N where P i a i (x 1 ; : : : ; x N ) M guarantees feasibility. (Note that a i indicates the probability that agent i receives the good when the goods are indivisible and the fraction of the good received.)
11 Denote A as the set 7 By having drawn from an arbitrary distribution with v and g functions of ; we have a extra degree of freedom. By assuming a uniform distribution, we eliminate this extra degree of freedom and gain simplicity of the expressions in the paper. Also by doing so, we are able to continue to treat v( ) and g( ) even-handedly (not write one in terms of the other).
8 This is fairly innocuous since we can always reorder v and g to obtain continuous functions that do satisfy this condition (and approximate them using twice di¤erentiable functions).
9 The maximal willingness m is such that v( ) g( )m = 0 or m = v( )=g( ). Note m is in terms of cost, that is, one would be willing to send a signal x in order to receive the object if c(x) m: With this interpretation it is again clear one can reorder types to have v=g weakly increasing.
10 Let us call the chance of receiving the object W (we make use of this notation later in the paper). An agent of type i will be willing to send a signal x to receive the object with that chance would so if the expected payo¤ W v( i ) c(x) g( i ) 0: The derivative of this payo¤ w.r.
From the inequality (and that v is strictly positive) we have W c(x) g( i )=v( i ): This shows that the derivative is larger than c(x) [(g( i 
of which in turn is larger than zero. 11 Note that there is free disposal. Also, we consider giving an agent more than measure one of the good of feasible allocation rules. Given allocation rule a, the agents form a Bayes-Nash equilibrium by choosing a strategy x i ( i ; a) to maximize their expected surplus given the strategies of other agents. The designer's problem is to choose rule a to maximize the equilibrium social surplus of the agents given the future Bayes-Nash equilibria of the agents, that is, the designer
Mechanism Design Problem
For simplicity of analysis we will invoke the revelation principle and look at direct mechanisms where each agent i sends a costless (but not necessarily truthful) signal e i . Given the set of signals f e 1 ; : : : ; e N g, the mechanism gives an object to agent i with probability 
Notice that this can be implemented since e i ( i ) does not depend upon j (j 6 = i).
Now by limiting ourselves to symmetric mechanisms, we can denote W ( e i ) as the probability of agent i receiving an object with message e i when everyone else reports truthfully the equivalent to giving the agent measure one and disposing of the excess.
12 A lottery would allocate objects with probability W i ( e 1 ; : : : ; e N ) = M=N . A contest with M = 1 would allocate objects according to W i ( e 1 ; : : : ; e N ) equals 0 if e i < maxf e 1 ; : : : ; e N g or equals 1=# if e i = maxf e 1 ; : : : ; e N g where # is the number of j where e j = maxf e 1 ; : : : ; e N g: and e( e i ) as the expected cost given that everyone else reports truthfully.
13;14 For simplicity of notation, we drop the i subscript. Both W ( e ) and e( e ) are assumed to be increasing in e . Now an agent of type reporting e (with all others reporting truthfully) has payo¤
The agent solves max e ( ; e ) which in a truthful mechanism should equal ( ; ).
The designer chooses W ( e ) and e( e ) to maximize N E[
subject to W ( ) being consistent with feasibility, IC ( ( ; ) ( ; e )) and IR ( ( ; ) 0). Before getting to our results, in the following lemma we simplify the designer's problem by eliminating from the problem, the IC and IR constraints as well as the choice of
Lemma 1 The designer's problem reduces to choosing W ( ) that is increasing and consistent with feasibility in such a way to maximize the social surplus given by
where
Proof. See the Appendix.
Notice that as one may expect increasing v( ) to v( ) increases surplus by factor : Also, somewhat less obvious, increasing g( ) to g( ) does not alter the surplus. This is for the same reason that our cost function, c(x); does not appear in the surplus. Namely, if agents have proportionately lower waiting costs, they will simply dissipate the gains by proportionately increasing the cost of e¤ort.
13 Note it is not optimal to restrict the number of participants as opposed to other environments where the designer values the signals such as Fullerton and McAfee (1999) , indicative that our symmetric assumption is not crucial.
14 Note that in order to be able to determine the allocation rule, we would need to decompose W ( ) into W i ( e 1 ; : : : ; e N ): This is not a problem since any mechanism described by W ( ) that is feasible with increasing W ( ) can be decomposed into a mechanism W i ( e 1 ; : : : ; e N ) that is symmetric and satis…es monotonicity: if e i > e 0 i then W i ( e 1 ; : : : ; e i ; : : : ; e N ) W i ( e 1 ; : : : ; e 0 i ; : : : ; e N ). Likewise, any mechanism that satis…es monotonicity and symmetry has an increasing W ( ):
Results

Optimal Mechanism
We now use the simpli…ed designer's problem to solve for an optimal mechanism in a manner similar to Myerson (1981) .
15 Denote the surplus per object from running a lottery for N agents as S`(that is, equation (1) with W ( ) = 1=N ): Also, denote
The expression z( )= represents the average virtual surplus of all types from 0 to : 16 Hence,
0 R 1 e g(^ )d^ is the virtual surplus for type . Note that the end points of 0 and 1 contain what can be thought of as a …xed virtual surplus. While this is non-standard, one can understand this better by using the analogy of a cost function c(y) where c 0 (y) is the marginal cost, c(y)=y is the average cost, and lim y&0 c(y) the …xed cost.
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Let C( ) be the convex envelope of z( ), that is, C( ) = Conv(z( )) where
Since C is convex, C 00 0.
Proposition 1 An optimal mechanism has the following allocation: the interval [0; 1] can be divided into regions where C 00 ( ) > 0 (a contest) or when C 00 ( ) = 0 (a lottery). Goods 15 There is a unique ex-ante optimal allocation if the set f 2
16 Virtual surplus is the surplus generated by giving the object to someone of type taking into account the full cost this has on incentives. Namely, the cost to designer of keeping the other (higher) types truthtelling rather than pretending to be a lower type. 17 We may have lim %1 z( ) > or < z (1). This has no parallel with cost functions but becomes important with monotonicity of the probability of receiving an object.
are allocated sequentially. If the highest type falls within a contest region, then the agent of that type receives the good, otherwise there is a lottery among all agents whose types fall within that region. That agent is removed and the process is repeated until all goods have been allocated. (We explain this further in the examples).
In order to see why the convex envelope C yields the optimal allocation, start with allocating objects according to the highest type. Take the graph of z( ): If there is a region,
; that is concave (decreasing slope) on [ 1 , 2 ]; then allocating this by the highest type would not yield the highest revenue since one would more likely be giving it to someone with a lower virtual surplus (lower slope of z). Replacing this with a lottery on [ 1 , 2 ] will yield higher surplus. 19 The average virtual surplus in that region is (z( 2 ) z( 1 )) = ( 2 1 ) : This is equal to the slope of the line from ( 1 ; z( 1 )) to ( 2 ; z( 2 )) on the graph of z( ). We can thus replace region with on a new z( ) with a line between those points. Now, it is worthwhile to expand any regions by including the type at 2 to the lottery on [ 1 ; 2 ] if slope of z( 2 ) at 2 is smaller than the slope from ( 1 ; z( 1 )) to ( 2 ; z( 2 )). Thus, the region 18 When`1 < 0; we de…ne = 1 as a contest region. 19 If f 1 (the probability of receiving an object) is strictly increasing and f 2 (the virtual surplus) is strictly decreasing, then
is the av-
The inequality now becomes
should be expanded until the average virtual surplus in the lottery region stops decreasing.
Graphically, this is the line from ( 1 ; z( 1 )) to the end of the lottery stops decreasing in slope. 20 By repeating this process, we arrive at the convex envelope C which generates the optimal allocation. Now making use of Proposition 1, we …nd which mechanisms will result in the optimal allocation.
When a Lottery is Optimal
We now with help of Proposition 1, we can specify necessary and su¢ cient conditions for a lottery to be optimal.
Proposition 2 A lottery is an optimal mechanism if and only if for all the average virtual surplus up to is greater than the (overall) average virtual surplus, that is, z( )= z (1) for all :
Proof. The mechanism presented in Proposition 1 will be a lottery if and only if C Example 1 When N = 2, M = 1; which has higher surplus: (a) holding one lottery or (b)
holding a lottery among types below and a lottery among types above ?
The overall lottery yields higher surplus over the two lotteries if and only if z(1)
. We see this in agreement with Proposition 2.
While it is useful to have necessary and su¢ cient conditions for a lottery to be optimal, we …nd it also useful to examine particular su¢ cient conditions as well. 20 The beginning = 0, can be thought of as a degenerate lottery region. If
then there is the equivalent of a …xed cost and average virtual surplus would always initially be decreasing resulting in a region of a lottery starting at 0 to be part of the optimal allocation.
0, then a lottery is optimal.
(ii) If v(1) is bounded and g(1) > 0, then there exists an > 0 where for environment g;
a lottery will be the optimal mechanism.
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Proof. First, we prove (i). If
d^ is weakly decreasing and`1 0, then a lottery is an optimal mechanism. Begin by looking at the …rst part of the expression in Lemma 1. Since the part inside the integral (not considering W ( )) is decreasing, the integral is maximized with a lottery ( ‡at W ( )). Now notice that the second part of the expression in Lemma 1 is maximized by maximizing W (0); this happens also with a lottery (since W must be weakly increasing). Finally, since`1 0; the third part is maximized by minimizing W (1), which also happens with a lottery.
By the mean value theorem, we have
where ( ) is between and 1. If
0, then this expression is negative. If
to be bounded we must have g( ) increasing as approaches 1. If so, by the mean value theorem,
The proof of part (ii) is in the Appendix.
Note that part (i) that a lottery is optimal if v=g is weakly concave. From the surplus, slope of v=g does not a¤ect the decision upon which mechanism to employ. However, if this slope is increasing, it becomes increasingly expensive in terms of value for the high types 21 It is also possible to show that if (1 )v 0 ( ) is decreasing in and g 0 ( ) 0; then a lottery is socially optimal.
to signal. In this case, the messages made by the higher-value agents are too costly for the society to waste and therefore it is better to run a lottery, that is, allocate the good randomly.
22 While the proof of part (ii) is not particularly straightforward, the intuition of the result is clear. Since b v( )=g( ) = v( )=g( ) + ; a larger makes the di¤erent types relatively close in terms of v( )=g( ). Hence, when the di¤erences between types become relatively smaller, that is, a larger part of the value is common, a lottery would be the optimal mechanism. We now see that the su¢ cient conditions can be useful in …nding examples where a lottery is optimal.
Example 2 N = 2, M = 1; v( ) = ; and g( ) = 1:
In this case,
00
= 0. Thus, the social planner does better by running a lottery, with
, than a contest, with surplus 2
, (or any other mechanism).
This contrasts with a mechanism that maximizes revenue when payments can be collected. Namely, types < ) receives the object.
Example 3 v( ) = ( + c) and g( ) = ( + c) where ; c; > 0 and 0 < 1:
This is a generalization of the previous example. 23 Notice that a lottery can be optimal
22 With possibility of costless messages, a lottery is only the unique optimal mechanism among monotonic mechanisms (as described in footnote 14). For instance, when N = 2, M = 1, one can ask players to send a costless signal s i of their types. If s i > s j then only if s i s j < 0:5, the mechanism would allocate it to i. If players truth tell, the expected probability of winning will be the same. Monotonicity is violated since if s 2 = 0:8; player 1 wins with a signal of s 1 = 0:1, but loses with a signal of s 1 = 0:4:
23 When c = 0; a lottery is still socially optimal even though our assumption that g(0) > 0 is violated. This is because lim &0
When a Contest is Optimal
We can also use Proposition 1 to specify the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for a contest to be optimal.
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Proposition 4 A contest is an optimal mechanism if and only if 
Corollary 1 (i) For a contest to be optimal, we must have
0 everywhere.
(ii) For a contest to be optimal, either v(1) needs to be unbounded or g(1) must equal 0:
Proof. From the proof of Proposition 2 (i), we have
From Proposition 4, this must be weakly positive for a contest to be optimal. This can only happen if
From the proof of Proposition 2 (ii), if v(1) is bounded and g(1) > 0, then lim !1
d^ cannot be weakly increasing.
We now provide two examples where a contest is the best way to allocate a good. In the …rst case, v is unbounded. In the second case, g(1) = 0.
24 Such conditions would require that the designer would allocate to the objects to the agent with the highest type. In the standard auction framework, …rst-price, second-price and all-pay auctions would all acheive this with the same expected payments for each agent of a particular type. However, a …rst-price or second-price auction would …rst require a signal to be sent and then payment to be paid. In our model, this would require both a costless initial signal and a wasteful payment to be made after the allocation decision has been decided. It seems to us that a contest is a more viable mechanism both politically and for credible commitment reasons. 
which is increasing in ; v(0) = 0 and`1 = 0:
Remark 1 The optimal mechanism depends upon v and g, not just v=g.
We see this by means of the following example which has the same v=g ratio as the previous example but instead of a contest being optimal, a lottery is optimal.
Example 6 N = 2, M = 1; v( ) = (1 ); and g( ) = (1 ) 3 : for all 2 [0; 1]; a lottery is optimal.
When More Complicated Mechanisms Are Optimal
There are still possibilities under Proposition 1 when neither a lottery or contest is optimal.
Remark 2 Under certain conditions, a more complicated mechanism can be optimal such as (i) a contest with a bid cap,
(ii) a lottery among low types but a contest for high types, (iii) several regions where each region is of contest or lottery.
We illustrate the variety of possible mechanisms by means of examples. In example 7, we show that a contest with bid caps can be optimal, while in example 8 we indicate that a lottery, when all values are low, followed by a contest for higher values is optimal. Finally, in example 9, we show that a contest followed by a lottery and then again followed by a contest is the optimal mechanism. Note that in all the examples the main intuition for the use of a particular mechanism, is if the virtual surplus increases or falls. If the virtual surplus increases then it means that e¢ ciency increases with a non-cooperative bidding mechanism while if the surplus falls a random allocation is better.
and g( ) = 1: then the good is allocated randomly, otherwise whoever has the higher gets the good. Such an allocation results from running a contest with an appropriate bid cap. Under such an allocation the social surplus is
A bid cap allows us to implement the above allocation by choosing , the probability of winning with is
which achieves its maximum of 0:36849 at = 1=4:
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Examine the thin line in Figure 1 . This represents the virtual surplus of giving the object to an agent of type . For all , it is also worthwhile to give the object than not to give the object. Notice that for points to the right of the graph, such as = 0:9 and = 0:8; one would prefer to give the object to the agent with lower : However, with the restriction in probability, the designer can at most keep the probability of receiving the object the same (holding a lottery). While the surplus reaches the peak at = 0:5; we would still want to hold a lottery between someone with someone with = 0:5 and someone with = 0:4; since under the increasing probability restriction, we must choose between either holding a lottery The optimal mechanism will weigh this average against the virtual surplus of : When the surplus of is higher, then will be added to the lottery. When the average above is higher, then higher will be preferred as in a contest. The average surplus above is
(1 )(1 + 2 ).
This equals the virtual surplus when 1 6
(1 )(1 + 2 ) = (1 ) or when = 1=4;
con…rming the above.
Thus far, we have presented the mechanism in terms of : Now, we demonstrate how this would work in terms of bids x. To do so, we must …rst calculate the expected e¤ort an agent of type must expend in the optimal mechanism. The probability of getting an object with type < 1=4 is just the probability that the other agent has a lower type : For 1=4 it is the probability that the other agent has a type less than 1=4 plus half the chance otherwise, totalling 5=8. Thus,
otherwise.
We can now substitute this into equation ( : An agent with a higher , gains more from winning, while an agent with a lower gains less from winning. Since bidding at the bid cap wins with higher probability, all agents with < 1=4 prefer bidding beneath the bid cap and agents with 1=4 prefer bidding at the bid cap. 27 Note that over the discrete jump in W i ( ); we make use of Dirac-Delta functions to obtain our results (the increase in payments is the probability jump multiplied by^ 2 =2 evaluated at the jump. ; then the good is allocated randomly, otherwise whichever is higher gets the good. Such an allocation results from running a contest with a minimum bid and allocating the good randomly if no one meets the minimum bid. From this, the social
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We will now see that this is the optimal mechanism under the probability limitation.
In Figure 2 , as before, the thin line in the graph represents the virtual surplus of giving the object to an agent of type . Again, for all , it is also worthwhile to give the object than not to give the object. Notice that now for points to the left of the graph, such as = 0:2 and = 0:1; a designer prefers to give the object to the agent with lower : Hence, under the probability restriction, the designer would choose a lottery for those points. While the surplus reaches the minimum at = 0:75; we would still want to hold a lottery beyond this point, for example between someone with = 0:75 and = 0:8: This is for similar reasons to those in example 7. Namely, since under the increasing probability restriction, we need to make the choice between holding a lottery amongst someone with = 0:8 and all those with 0:75 or always giving the object to someone with = 0:8 over all those with 0:75:
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This leads us to the thick line in the graph that represents the average virtual surplus of
The optimal mechanism will weigh this average against the virtual surplus of : If the surplus of is higher, then will be preferred. When the average below is higher, then will be added to the lottery. This crossing point is at = 0:9117: As in example 7, we can use equation (3) to determine the minimum bid to be included in the all-pay auction. Since in the lottery phase, when < ;
Going from the lottery to the all-pay auction the jump in probability is =2: Thus, the jump in and g( ) = 1:
(1 ) 1:5 + 3 . This …rst increases, then decreases, and then again increases till = 1. In this case, the following mechanism is optimal, where the social planner …rst runs an all-pay auction then a lottery and then runs an all-pay auction for the high value agents. This yields the following allocation: 1 and 2 denote the types of the agents. If 1 ; 2 are in [0:45; 0:91], then the good is allocated randomly. Otherwise, it is allocated to the one with the highest : Note that from = 0:45 to = 0:91 the social planner will run a lottery and in the rest of the range a contest will be used. Therefore, the social surplus is 
This is a combination of our two previous examples with the lottery range in the middle.
Denote the lottery range from a to b . We must compare the average virtual surplus of those in the range to those out of the range. We would prefer a in [ a , b ] to those below a if the average surplus is higher than the surplus of all those below and prefer those above b if the average surplus is lower than the surplus of all these values. Since the virtual surplus is increasing (and continuous) outside of this range, this can only happen if the average virtual surplus is equal to the virtual surplus on both ends:
We see this in Figure 3 . Again, the thin line is the virtual surplus. Here, the thick line helps to demonstrate the range of types where a lottery should be used. With this line, both endpoints have the same virtual surplus. This virtual surplus should also equal the average virtual surplus in the range of the thick line. In order for this to happen, the area above it and below the thin line and below it and above the thin line should cancel (be equal).
As with examples 7 and 8, we can determine the mechanism in regards to an auction.
The mechanism would combine a bid cap with a minimum bid but ironically with the bid cap …rst. The cap will start with x and go to x: It is a cap in the sense that any bid between
x and x will count only as much as x. These can be determined in a similar way as in examples 7 and 8. We observe in numerous instances where goods are allocated by one of the more complicated methods of examples 7 to 9, that is, a method beyond a straight lottery or contest. For instance, the way example 7 could work in practice, is to allocate tickets for an event by having a lottery for anyone that waits x hours for tickets and if there are tickets left after that, allocate the tickets through lottery. Another illustration of this is the ticket distribution by All England Tennis and Croquet Club for the Wimbledon tennis tournament. The club …rst holds a lottery to allocate the tickets almost six months before the Wimbledon tournament and then gives them away in …rst come …rst serve basis or person willing to stand longest in the queue. (We presume that buying tickets six-months prior takes more e¤ort.) We see a system like example 8 with the distribution of entries in the New York marathon. 29 Those 29 Some may be surprised to discover that the right to run in the major marathons needs to be rationed. There are logistic limits to supply and demand for 26 miles of punishment is high. We also note that transfer that put in greater e¤ort can qualify automatically (by completing a number of sanctioned races or making a qualifying time), remaining entries are distributed by a lottery system. Finally, in example 9, we see where it is optimal to run a contest …rst, and then allocate the good randomly and for the higher values again run a contest. One possible example of this is admissions to top US universities among students with high test scores. Writing an essay is part of the application. As most lecturers know, most essays are indistinguishable in level. A few good ones stand out as well as a few bad ones. It is possible that an admissions o¢ cer would …rst admit the good essays and then randomly select among the middle pile.
If there are still slots left, the o¢ cer may start to o¤er admissions to the top of the lower group. Similarly, there are more students that apply to Oxford or Cambridge Universities with the highest score on the admissions tests (three As in the A-level exams) than places.
To select students, interviews are held. We can interpret the interviews (where preparation can help) as the socially wasteful but necessary to signal the type of the students.
Scarcity
An important question is whether scarcity of goods (the number of goods relative to the number of agents) favors one mechanism over another. To answer this question, we must …rst …nd a way to compare mechanisms across environments. We do so by the following de…nition.
De…nition 1 Two mechanisms are said to be equivalent if their W functions have the same regions where they are strictly increasing, that is, a mechanism characterized by W a is equivalent to one characterized by
We can now use the above de…nition to show that an optimal mechanism does not depend upon the scarcity of the good. of numbered bibs is currently prohibited on both medical and fairness grounds (see Blecher, 2006 for details).
Proposition 5 For any mechanism that is optimal in environment (v; g; M; N ) (and described by Proposition 1) there is an equivalent mechanism that is an optimal mechanism in environment (v; g; c M ; b N ). However, which of two equivalent non-optimal mechanisms yield higher social surplus may depend upon M or N .
Proof. Denote C a as the C function used to generate the mechanism (via Proposition 1)
if and only if C a ( 2 ) > C a ( 1 ). Now notice that C functions are independent of M or N (they depend only on v and g). Hence, for environment (v; g; c M ; b N ) the C function would equal C a and hence the W function, W b , would have the property that
We will now show the second part of the proposition. We do so by means of an example
showing that in comparing two non-optimal mechanisms which is higher changes in either M or N . More speci…cally, a lottery is optimal when M = 1 and N = 3; however, a contest is optimal either when M = 2 and N = 3 or M = 1 and N = 2. The details are as follows: g( ) = 1 and v( ) = ; yielding virtual surplus of (1 ): The social surplus with a contest with one object, M = 1; is
. The surplus with a contest with two objects, M = 2; is
. The surplus with a lottery is
(independent of N): Take = 5=4. When we have N = 2 and M = 1, the surplus for the contest, 0.1447; is greater than that of a lottery, 0.13675, however when N = 3 and M = 1; this is reversed, with surplus from contest, 0.1344, which is now smaller than that of a lottery. Finally, when we move to N = 3 and M = 2, the contest is again better than a lottery, with contest surplus, 0.299, and lottery surplus, 0.273. Taylor et al. (2003) and Koh et al. (2006) analyze allocation through lotteries and queues, and …nd that lotteries are more e¢ cient in comparison to waiting line auctions if the time valuation are less varied and objects are scarce. This may be surprising compared to the …rst part of the proposition, however the second part shows how our paper is consistent. Namely, we show that the optimal mechanism is independent of scarcity, while earlier papers compared only two di¤erent mechanisms. 
Other Interim-E¢ cient Allocations
Up to this point, we have studied ex-ante Pareto-optimal allocations. In such a manner, the designer treats every type with the same ex-ante weight. It is conceivable that the designer may want to favor some types over others. For instance, a designer may wish to count higher types more (they could be future donors) or lower types more (increasing future interest).
To include such a possibility, we need a set of weights ( ) such that
which the designer would maximize N E[ ( ) ( ; )]: This leads to the set interim-e¢ cient allocations (see Ledyard and Palfrey, 2007) . Observe that for equal weights, ( ) = 1; we have our original case of an ex-ante e¢ cient allocation.
Proposition 6 A ( ) interim-e¢ cient allocation for environment v( ) and g( ) is given
by Proposition 1 where
of v( ) and g( ):
Proof. In order for this proposition to hold, we need to show two problems yield the same solution: (A) choosing W ( ) and e( ) to maximize N E[ ( ) ( ; )] subject to W ( ) being consistent with feasibility, IC and IR constraints and (B) choosing W ( ) and e( ) to
is subject to W ( ) being consistent with feasibility, IC and IR constraints (with b v( ) and b g( )).
Thus, the objective function is the same. We now show that any allocation that satis…es IC and IR constraints for b v( ) and b g( ) will also satisfy IC and IR constraints for v( ) and g( ) and vice-versa.
0. Feasibility is also the same. Since the objective and constraints are the same, the solution must be the same. (Since b v( )=b g( ) = v( )=g( ); our assumption that v=g is increasing is still su¢ cient.)
As we see from the following Corollary, the Proposition expands our results.
Corollary 2 One result that may seem surprising is that if
0, then a lottery is optimal for any weighting of types. Intuitively, one may expect when higher types are weighted more, then a lottery may not be optimal. However,
0 is enough to ensure that the virtual surplus is decreasing for any ( ), since
5 Concluding remarks
This paper makes a contribution in the allocation of goods when signalling one's desire for the good is a wasteful activity. Under such conditions, there is a trade-o¤ between e¢ cient allocation and wasted resources. A mechanism such as a contest, which allocates by the highest signal, will allocate goods to the people who value them the most but the act of signalling will be wasteful. Allocating an equal share to everyone (or a random allocation by a lottery) saves any waste from signalling, but leads to an ex-post ine¢ cient allocation.
This analysis has many additional applications. Contests are also used to grant the Olympic games, where the individual cities submit bids, and part of the bids are often socially wasted. In the UK, governmental research funds are distributed through two main channels: research councils or quality-related (QR) funding. Research councils allocate funds to institutions by gathering private signals through research grant applications, for which the paper work can be considered socially wasteful. QR funding allocates funds through publicly available information such as publications, which presumably is less costly to gather (this is done through the Research Assessment Exercise, RAE). Our analysis can help design an appropriate mechanism. If the cost incurred by the institutions to make the case for grants is too high, the government should favour QR funding. Policy research into which system is best is an important area in which our paper contributes.
Our results also has implications for bidding rings (cartels) in auctions. In this literature, McAfee and McMillan (1992) …nd an optimal mechanism for collusion that agrees with our results. Namely, if the hazard rate is decreasing, bidders should participate in the auction non-cooperatively; however, if the hazard rate is increasing, then bidders should bid the reserve price whenever they value the object more than the reserve. In this application, the cartel's objective is congruent to that of our designer while the bids are analogous to our wasteful signal. Hence, our results indicate that the McAfee and McMillan results apply more generally. 31 Moreover, a connection would show that in many cases the optimal collusive policy would be something more complicated such as an increasing bid function that reaches a peak or bidding the reserve price for low values and then jump to bidding higher values.
There are many possible changes to our basic model for which similar analysis could be used. One change is to relax our key assumption of a wasteful signal to a partial wasteful signals. For instance, an agent of type sending a signal of x may have private value of sending the signal of c(x)g( ): This means the true waste is only (1 )c(x)g( ); however, as we saw that the cost function c(x) has no a¤ect on the optimal mechanism, this will also have no a¤ect. If instead there were a public bene…t to such a signal, then the higher the bene…t, the more likely the optimal mechanism would favour contests. We can also partially relax the assumption on payments to the designer. The necessary element for our analysis to apply is that there is a maximum price that the designer can charge and at this price, there is an excess demand (as the case with playo¤ tickets). The timing of the signals in our mechanism can also be changed while keeping the same nature of our results. For instance, a war of attrition can be used to allocate goods in place of a contest. A war of attrition with a time limit can be used in lieu of a contest with a bid cap.
While in this paper, we examined only the case where each agent has one of two possible allocations: with an object or without an object, we can apply this in any case with two possible outcomes. Think of the case where a course is o¤ered twice and students have to decide which time they want to be scheduled for (with all students being assigned to one of the two slots). If there is an excess demand for one of the time slots, then one can use our analysis to determine how to allocate the slots to the students demanding the popular time slot. (All students demanding the less popular slot will get it.)
A natural extension for our paper would be to consider several types of goods. Doing so would make it possible to explore a link to papers on pseudo-markets (markets using points rather than money), except we will optimize the method for obtaining points as a function of e¤ort (better grades yield more points in course markets). An exogenous allocation of points is similar to a lottery while points solely as a function of e¤ort is like a contest.
Fairness issues may also be considered in determining a mechanism. A lottery is ex-ante (and interim) fair in that everyone has an equal chance of receiving the good, but ex-post, those not allocated the good envy those allocated the good. The losers in a contest are worse o¤ than those not given the good if a lottery were run in its place; however, the losers in a contest envy the winners less than in a lottery (since in a contest the winners pay more than the losers). Hence, which mechanism is deemed fairer could depend upon the circumstances. First, satisfying the …rst-order condition of the agents problem e ( ; ) = 0; having (0; 0) 0 and limiting W ( e ) and e( e ) to be increasing is su¢ cient to satisfy incentive compatibility and individual rationality, since the single-crossing property is satis…ed by our assumption of v 0 ( )=v( ) > g 0 ( )=g( ). Second, we can also take advantage of the …rst-order condition and use the envelope theorem to …nd the agents'surpluses. Let ( ) max e ( ; e ): Now by the envelope theorem, we have
Therefore,
As mentioned before, the designer cares only about the total expected utility of the agents subject to feasibility (all collected e( ) are wasted) and has payo¤:
(the last part by integration by parts.)
Finally, we can eliminate e( ) from (2) since e( ) is dictated in the …rst-order condition
Hence,
(Note the designer would always want to set e( ) = 0:) 33 Now by eliminating e( ); the designer's payo¤ now becomes
Integrating by parts of the second expression yields:
We can rewrite this as
Again doing integration by parts yields
d^ , respectively, yields the lemma.
Proof of Proposition 1
The proof follows the method of Myerson (1981, section 6) with the necessary extension to deal with z( ) and C( ) at the endpoints of 0 and 1. For notational simplicity, denote z 0 (0)
We can rewrite the surplus (divide by N ) from Lemma 1 using z( ) and C( ) as follows.
Let us call the c W ( ) resulting probability of receiving the object from the mechanism described in the Proposition. We will …rst show that the last expression of 6 is maximized by c W ( ): Notice that since z( ) C( ); for any weakly increasing W; we have
By integration by parts, this then implies
Therefore, if we show that
then we prove that the last expression of 6 is maximized by c W ( ): Take If there is no point 2 (0; 1) where z( ) = C( ); then c W is a lottery and constant.
Equation (7) follows. We now know that equation (7) holds if there exists a particular 1 and 2 that satis…es our original conditions 0 1 2 1, z( 1 ) = C( 1 ), and z( 2 ) = C( 2 ); yet also satisfy R we can set 2 = 1; and the second condition is satis…ed. If`1 > 0; then we can de…ne 2 as maxf > 0jz( ) = C( )g and proceed in a similar manner.
Now we are left to show that the …rst two expressions of equation (7), 
Proof of Proposition 3 (ii)
We start (1 ) = 0: Denote z(v=g) = 1 (v=g) and x = v=g. Since v and g are analytic functions, z(x) is also an analytic function. We also have z(x) strictly increasing on (x; x) with z(x) = 1. Since v(1) is bounded, g(1) > 0; it must be that x is …nite. We will now show that Hence, for the same reasons, we must have lim x!x z 00 (x) = 0: We can repeat this inde…-nitely, we must have all derivatives equal 0 at x: Therefore, the Taylor Geometrically, the slope of z( ) is not only bounded, but ‡at as it nears 1. Increasing v( ) to b v( ) simply shifts z( ) up by a constant. Since it is weakly increasing for all < 1, for a large enough shift we have C( ) simply be a line from z(0) to z(1) and hence a lottery is an optimal mechanism.
